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Solving International Environmental
Crimes: The International Environmental
Military Base Reconstruction Act -a
Problem, a Proposal, and a Solution
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last thirty years international environmental law has
entered the corpus of legitimate international law. There has been
progress in treaty-based law, customary international law, and
even domestic environmental legislation. Although the world has
acknowledged the importance of environmental protections for
the future of all species, much is still left unanswered. Currently,
the international and U.S.-based domestic remedies for
environmental damage on foreign U.S. military bases are grossly
inadequate.
Since World War II, the United States has followed a military
continuum that has disrupted or destroyed many international
ecosystems. During World War I and World War II, the United
States government created, occupied, and abandoned many
overseas military bases; for example, the Philippines and Panama
were used for training, industrial operations, and wars.I These
overseas military installations - some abandoned, some active have become breeding grounds for environmental damage. After
the U.S. military vacated the Subic Naval Station and Clark Air
Base in the Philippines, Filipinos discovered a "'horror story'
including tons of toxic chemicals dumped on the ground and into
the water, or buried in uncontrolled landfills."2
Carcinogenic chemicals, mutagenic metals, and unexploded
bombs saturate nearly three hundred closed and closing American

1. See generally John Lindsay-Poland & Nick Morgan, Overseas Military Bases and
Environment,

FOREIGN

POLICY

http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol3/15ifmil.pdf.
2. Id. para. 2.

IN

FOCUs,

June

1998,

available

at
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bases overseas. After the U.S. military moves out, natives often
use many of the bases for housing, schools, and recreational
activities. Reuse of the military base land seems beneficial, but the
conditions on those lands pose dangerous threats to human health
and the surrounding environments.
Over 7,000 families live on what was once Clark Air Field;
their drinkin water comes from shallow wells in contaminated
groundwater. Rashes, still births, and astroenteritis are frequent
problems caused by toxic exposure. In Panama, twenty-one
individuals have been killed by explosives, and concentrations of
pollutants in water and soil are hazardously high.' Most
importantly, the governments of Panama and the Philippines are
left to fend for themselves as the U.S. claims no responsibility for
the clean-up of their prior military bases.'
In this Comment, I consider the cause, nature, and effects of
U.S. military base occupations. Using the Philippines and Panama
as case studies, I will look at the forms of environmental damage
left behind and the potential health hazards for natives. Part II of
this Comment will give a brief description of international military
agreements between the U.S., Panama, and the Philippines; I will
explain why it is common to overlook these documents or oral
agreements as they relate to environmental damage. Part III will
discuss the specific pollution at military bases in the Philippines
and Panama. Part IV will consider liability; specifically, this section
will examine current American environmental liability regimes
and international environmental liability regimes. Further, Part IV
will espouse a draft statute as a potential solution to the problem.
Part V will conclude and summarize the pertinent observations
made in this Comment.
In the current U.S. War on Terrorism, the invasion and
occupation of foreign territories poses future international
environmental concerns. It is only a matter of time before U.S.
military base occupation and its territories expand in foreign
countries. As such, the environmental damage zones will also
3. See Inst. for Policy Studies Peace and Sec. Program, International Grassroots
Summit on Military Base Cleanup: A Healthy Environment Is a Human Right,
Introduction, para. 3, (1999), http://www.webcom.com/ncecd/) [hereinafter Grassroots
Summit].
4. Id. para. 5.
5. Id.
6. See generally id. paras. 2, 6.
7. Lindsay-Poland & Morgan, supra note 1, para. 6.
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proliferate. Based on past and present examples, it would be most
advantageous for the U.S. Congress to take action and address this

problem directly before the environmental damage destroys any
possibility of effectively recovering what has been lost.
II. BACKGROUND
Foreign U.S. military agreements are often vague,
inconsistent treaties that evidence the unequal bargaining power
between the developed U.S. superpower and smaller, developing
countries.' For example, in Panama, the U.S. entered into the
Panama Canal Treaty of 1903 to establish "fortifications" in the
canal area.9 This treaty led to a U.S. military occupation peak
during World War II as over 68,000 men were placed on more than
one hundred military installations. 0 By 1977, the U.S. and Panama
once again entered a military treaty ("the Panama Treaty"); this
treaty stated that all the property and operations currently held by
the U.S. military would revert to the Panamanian government by
2000.11

The language of the second Panama Treaty was quite vague.
The portion of the treaty that addressed implementation of its
terms in a manner consistent with the natural environment of
Panama stated the U.S. and Panama "shall consult and cooperate
with each other in all appropriate ways to ensure that they shall
give due regard to the protection and conservation of the
environment." 2
This
language
proffers
no
definable
environmental limitations or regulations. In fact, the treaty
language is so overly broad that it is unlikely that it will effect any
type of significant change.
The Panama Treaty further states that the U.S. shall be
obligated to take "practicable steps" to reduce environmental

8. Lindsay-Poland & Morgan, supra note 1.
9. Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, U.S.-Pan., art. XXIII, 33 Stat. 2234 [hereinafter Panama
Canal Treaty I]; J. Martin Wagner & Neil A. F. Popovic, Environmental Injustice on
United States Bases in Panama: International Law and the Right to Land Free from
Contaminationand Explosives, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 401,406-07 (1998).
10. Wagner & Popovic, supra note 9, at 406-07.
11. The Panama Canal Treaty, U.S.-Pan, arts. HI(2), XIII(1), Sept. 7, 1977, 33 U.S.T.
39 (stating Panama assumes total responsibility for the Canal upon termination of treaty
on Dec. 31, 1999) [hereinafter Panama Canal Treaty II].
12. Id. art. VI(1).
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impact. The U.S. Department of Defense ("DOD"), however, has
limited this obligation by stating that:
In determining what is practicable, service component
commanders shall consider factors which include, but are not
limited to: whether a hazard poses a known imminent and
substantial danger to human life, health and safety; the cost of
removing the hazard; the time required to remove the hazard;
any adverse effects upon the environment
from removing the
S
13
hazard; and the technology available.
By limiting dangers to those of "imminent" threat, the U.S.
military allows itself to focus only on immediate effects upon the
environment. By disqualifying latent, long-term harms from their
obligation, the U.S. exited quickly and left Panama to deal with
any enduring environmental damage or health hazards on its own.
Further, cost has an enormous impact. Environmental
remediation costs can be extremely expensive. 14 Various studies
have estimated that clean-up of hazardous waste sites in the
United States can cost at least $400 billion. 5 DOD remediation
sites can cost over $10 billion. 6 To be sure, the Panama Treaty
offers little to no practical enforcement power. Further, the DOD
values its own judgment of the environmental conditions more
than the judgments of the Panamanian
people who are living in
17
basis.
daily
a
on
conditions
those
The tendency to draft away environmental rights also has
significance in the Philippines. Since President George W. Bush
declared the Global War on Terror in 2001, the Philippines and its
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
have whole-heartedly
supported the U.S. war. The Philippines made local training

13. Memorandum from Brigadier Gen. Joseph G. Garrett to Sec'ys. of the Military
Dep'ts., Policy for Guidance for the Transfer of DOD Installations to the Government of
Panama, Nov. 2, 1995, para. 4(b) (emphasis added).
14. U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., COMMERCIAL AGRIC. DIv.,
INDUSTRIAL

USES

OF

AGRICULTURAL

MATERIALS

SITUATION

AND

OUTLOOK,

REPORT No. IUS-6, at 32, (Sept. 1996), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/

publications/IUS6/ius6g.pdf.
15. David E. Salt, et al., Phytoremediation: A Novel Strategy for the Removal of Toxic
Metals from the Environment Using Plants, 13 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 468,468-69 (1995).
16. Id.
17. See Lindsay-Poland & Morgan, supra note 1, para. 10.
18. Albert Del Rosario, Ambassador of the Republic of the Phil. to the U.S., A
Progress Report on the Philippines: The Balikatan Exercises, the Abu Sayyaf, and AlQaeda (Mar. 19, 2002), in HERITAGE LECTURES, Mar. 27, 2002, at 1, available at
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facilities available to the U.S. military and designated all counterterrorism preparations as "joint activities" with the Philippine
Armed Forces. 9 By calling these "joint" activities, the DOD
from U.S.
effectively
exempted their military actions
environmental laws.20 Because international environmental laws
are also weak, the Philippines' agreeable disposition towards the
U.S. mission has inadvertently led to their relinquishment of
environmental rights over their own lands. The U.S. should not be
permitted to continue harming the environment without cost or
punishment.
The "agreements" between the U.S. and foreign countries
illuminate the power play that transpires between developing and
developed countries. In order to cut to the core of this problem, it
is best to look at the facts. It is only through a pure lens, devoid of
political power and economic evaluation, that the true nature of
the problem and a proper solution can be found.
III. THE PROBLEM: A LOOK AT THE PHILIPPINES AND PANAMA
Over the last sixty years, the United States has left behind
hundreds of thousands of acres of contaminated military lands
throughout the developing world. These lands primarily consist of
military bases that were once used for a number of military
operations. Often industrial, these operations involved aircraft and
ordinance
and equipment
warship operations, weapons,
manufacture/maintenance, live fire practice, and extensive
equipment training.2' Decades later, the environmental damage is
overwhelming. Toxic and hazardous contamination of the air, soil,
and water threaten human health, biodiversity, species habitat, and
untold natural resources. To better understand the nature and
extent of the damage, the Subic Bay and Clark Bases in the
Philippines and the Arraijan Tank Farm and Fort Davis in Panama
may be illustrative.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/HL738.cfm
Report on Philippines].
19. Id. at 2.

[hereinafter

Progress

20. See generally DONALD KIRK, LOOTED: THE PHILIPPINES AFTER THE BASES 8,

192-93 (1998).
21. Grassroots Summit, supranote 3, paras. 2-3.
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A. The Philippines
1. Subic Bay
After the United States granted the Philippines independence
in 1946, the two countries signed the Military Base Agreement in
1947 regarding the use of military bases in the Philippines for
22
ninety-nine years. Over many years, the U.S. military made
extensive use of their rights to Philippine lands. The bases were
considered vital to national security, military dominance, and anticommunist missions during the Cold War era.2 ' However, as the
Cold War era came to a close and foreign military locations were
of less importance to U.S. military interests, U.S. troops were less
inclined to remain overseas. Thus, when the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement expired in 1991, the U.S. government closed shop and
24
left the Philippines. Only after U.S. troops left would Philippine
natives come to realize the dangers those military occupations
caused, both to their environment and their health.
U.S. military withdrawal, the U.S. Senate
Before
commissioned the General Accounting Office ("GAO") to visit,
evaluate, and record any environmental damage on or around the
21
Philippine military bases.
While the GAO report found
"significant environmental damage" at both Subic and Clark,
damage so extensive as to "not be in compliance with U.S.
environmental standards,, 26 the authors determined that without
adequate and well-defined environmental liability regimes, the
U.S. DOD was under no responsibility to remediate any of the
damage found.27 The specific cases of environmental damage are
shocking.
One such example was the Subic Bay Navy Facility's power
plant. This plant was believed to contain and emit unknown
polychlorinated biphenyl ("PCB") and other untreated pollutants
U.S. FINANCIAL
22. U.S. GEN. Acr.
OFFICE, MILITARY BASE CLOSURES:
OBLIGATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES 10 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
23. See DONALD M. SNOW, NATIONAL SECURITY: ENDURING PROBLEMS IN A
CHANGING DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT 173 (2d ed. 1991).
24. People's Task Force on Bases Clean-up, Chronology of Events Related to the
Struggle for Environmental Justice at the Former Bases in the Philippines (Jim Zwick
ed.), http://www.boondocksnet.com/centennial/sctexts/bases env-chron.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter People's Task Force]; see GAO Report, supra note 22.
25. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-2.
26. Id. at 27.
27. Id.
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28

into the air. Surprisingly,
after findin2 these substances, the DOD
• ,
did not investigate or test further. Instead, in various DOD
reports, Naval environmental officials inattentively expressed that
the air emissions would have failed U.S. Clean Air standards.0 The
reports also mentioned that there was a lack of sanitary sewer
systems and waste treatment facilities 'on the military bases."
Unfortunately, the Subic Bay Navy Facility's sewage
and waste
12
was discharged into the natural waters of Subic Bay.
Thus, the Subic Bay facility was an environmental mess,
overflowing with pollutants and foreign substances, lying in wait to
those natives who would settle nearby.
2. Clark Air Base
A comprehensive study was also performed on the Clark Air
Base. In 1993, scientists from the University of Maryland analyzed
and studied soil and air samples from the Philippine Clark Base,
and tested water located in and around the base site.33 The study
found PCB, pesticides, and heavy metals in the water, air, and
soil. 34 After the University of Maryland Scientists' report, the
Philippine government requested another study be done by a U.S.
consulting firm called Weston International.35
Weston International's findings were disconcerting. The study
found that "[t]wenty-one sites had at least one pollutant that
exceeded drinking water standards, including the heavy metals
mercury and lead, pesticide dieldrin, and various solvent[s]

including benzene and toluene. 3 1 Soil samples were just as grim,
reporting that "thirteen soil test sites confirmed unsafe levels of
contaminants including PCB, pesticides aldrin, dieldrin and
heptachlor, and petroleum hydrocarbons."37 Most of the toxins
found at Clark have been shown to cause serious health problems.
28. Id. at 28.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id.
33. CNN Specials: Military Mess Part4: Third World Peoples Suffer (CNN television
broadcast Nov. 7, 1993) (transcript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International &
Comparative Law Review) [hereinafter Military Mess].
34. Id.
35. Aimee Suzara, Facing the Toxic Legacy: A Personal Encounter, MAGANDA
MAG., 1999, at 63.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Benzene has been linked to leukemia; mercury and lead can cause
brain dysfunction, tremors, and speech problems; pesticides like
DDT, aldrin, and dieldrin can cause nervous system disorders
resulting in convulsions;38 and chlordane may lead to
neuroblastoma, acute leukemia, aplastic anemia, and blood
dyscrasas. 9 When this evidence is considered alongside the fact
that Subic Bay and Clark Air Base sites are extremely close to
Filipino communities filled with children and elderly citizens, only
then can the gravity of the current situation be realized."°
B. Panama
Following the 1903 military agreement between the United
States and Panama, the U.S. military occupied more than one
hundred bases, with over 68,000 troops, for nearly one hundred
years. 41 Missions ranged from eliminating security threats and
maintaining the Canal to engagin in active combat preparation
and wide-ranging military practice. By 1977, it was time for a new
Canal Treaty. Panama and the United States entered a new treaty
in which the U.S. would return all land to Panama by 2000.
Though there is language in this agreement discussing
environmental damage, once the transfer of ownership occurred,
the U.S. claimed it was no longer responsible for the damage.
Similar to the legacy in the Philippines, the U.S. transferred all
bases to Panama and only recently have the Panamanians come to
realize the extent of damage to their environment and their future
health.

38. U.N. Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], SafeWork, Safety in the Use of Chemicals (For
Secondary Education), ch. 2 (Feb. 2000) (prepared by Nabil T. Watfa et al.),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/safework/papers/schoolch/ch2.htm.
39. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY
AND
HEALTH
GUIDELINE
FOR
HEPTACHLOR,
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/healthguidelines/heptachlor/recognition.html (last visited Sep.
1,2006).
40. See Military Mess, supra note 33.
41. Panama Canal Treaty I, supra note 9, art. XXII.
42. MICHAEL KEEFE ET AL. & JONATHAN SPERKA, PRC ENVTL. MGMT., INC. &
NAVAL EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TECH. DIV., UNEXPLODED ORDINANCE
ASSESSMENT OF U.S. MILITARY RANGES IN PANAMA: EMPIRE, BALBOA WEST, AND
PIIA RANGES, at ES-1, 7 (Jan. 1997) [hereinafter ORDINANCE ASSESSMENT].
43. Panama Canal Treaty 1I, supra note 11, arts. 11(2), XIII(1).
44. Id. art. XIII(3).
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1. Arraijan Tank Farm
The Arraijan Tank Farm, built in 1942, has been used to store
Navy fuel oil, diesel fuel, and aviation gasoline.4 ' The farm consists
of large underground storage systems of steel, buried about four to
eight feet under the ground, which hold twenty-five to fifty
thousand barrels of fuel. The system is structurally inadequate as
discharged fuel can easily infect topsoil and reach soil impacted by
run-off.
Run-off contamination can lead to fuel displacement in local
rivers and water sources. The Installation Condition Report for
Arraijan noted at least five spills made up of JP5 turbine jet fuel.47
Furthermore, a report conducted by AGRA Earth &
Environmental showed that soil bordering and below the locations
of these spills contained high levels of petroleum hydrocarbons
(from 11,000 to 28,300 parts per million ("ppm")). 48 Nearby wells
showed petroleum hydrocarbon levels of 1,860 ppm at two feet
sub-surface, and at 3,420 ppm at eight feet sub-surface. 49 Along
with the underground tanks, Arraijan also possesses "sludge pits"
expected to contain such toxins as lead, toluene, xylene, benzene,
and ethyl benzene.50 As mentioned, lead can lead to severe health
problems such as leukemia, while toluene, xylene, benzene, and
ethyl benzene are known to cause problems with the liver, kidneys,
heart, lungs, and nervous system.

45.

U.S. ARMY GARRISON PANAMA,

INSTALLATION CONDITION REPORT:

FORT

DAVIS MILITARY RESERVATION, para. 6 (Feb. 2, 1995) [hereinafter FORT DAVIS
REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTALLATION CONDITION REPORT:
FUEL
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND STORAGE SYSTEM AT ARRAIJAN TANK FARM AND

RODMAN UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION PANAMA CANAL, para. 6b (Sept. 28, 1995)
[hereinafter ARRAIJAN REPORT].
46. ARRAIJAN REPORT, supra note 45, at 1-2.
47. Id. at 10.
48. Letter from John A. Mick, AEE, to Ing. Syda de Grimaldo, on Baseline
Environmental Assessment of the Arraijan Tank Farm and Rodman Station Fuel Storage
and Distribution Facilities (Nov. 11, 1996) [hereinafter John A. Mick Letter].
49. Id. For purposes of the following discussion, 1 ppm is equivalent to 1 mg/l.
Conversion Factors in Field Plot Work, PMEP, http://pmep.cce.cornell.edu/facts-slidesself/facts/gen-peapp-conv-table.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
50. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., PRELIMINARY ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATION TANK
BOTTOM SLUDGE DISPOSAL PITS, ARRAIJAN TANK FARM AND GATUN TANK FARMS

NAVAL STATION PANAMA CANAL, para. 1 (1991) [hereinafter SLUDGE REPORT].
51.

U.S.

DEP'T OF

INTERIOR,

NATIONAL

PARK

SERVICE,

CONTAMINANTS
ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Roy
J.
Irwin
ed.,
http://www.nature.nps.gov/hazardssafety/toxic/btexcmpd.pdf.

ENVIRONMENTAL

1997),

available

at
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2. Fort Davis
Fort Davis extends across 3,600 acres near the Atlantic
entrance to the Panama Canal.52 While the Fort Davis report
insists that there are no hazards to human life, health, and safety,
portions of the report seem to contradict this assessment. Water
considered to be "potable" has lead levels ranging from 5 to 87
parts per billion ("ppb").53 Water tests at Fort Davis elementary
school taps led to dismal results. A number of classrooms' taps
showed lead levels ranging from 4 to 44 ppb, and the nursery water
showed lead readings as high as 49 ppb. Thus, the average lead
level of all tested drinking water was in the 40 to 41 ppb range.
The U.S. government requires corrosion control treatment,
source water treatment, lead service line replacement,
and public
51
education if lead levels exceed 0.015 mg/L. Some common
problems associated with lead exposure are nervous and
reproductive system complications, kidney 'problems, and
difficulties with the production of red blood cells. Exposure may
also lead to mental impairment and clinical anemia. Children are
particularly vulnerable to the effects of lead: fetal or childhood
exposure causes
lower IQ scores, slowed growth, -and hearing
58
impairments. Thus, with the levels found at Fort Davis, severe
health problems are likely to result if nothing is done to clear the
contaminated land and water sources.
IV.

U.S. LIABILITY

The
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") is one of the most
pervasive U.S. environmental liability regimes. The Congressional
record shows that CERCLA was controversial well before its

52. FORT DAVIS
53. Id. $ 3(b)(2).

REPORT,

supra note 45,

2.

54. U.S. ARMY, ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR FT. DAVIS,
PANAMA (July 7, 1995).

55. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 141.80(c)(1) (2005).
56. JOHN HARTE ET AL., ToxIcs A TO Z: A GUIDE TO EVERYDAY POLLUTION
HAZARDS 334 (1991).

57. See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., PUBLIC HEALTH STATEMENT FOR LEAD: CAS # 7439-921, § 1.5 (stating "[1]ead exposure may cause anemia [and] [alt high levels ...
damage the brain .... ) [hereinafter ATSDR].
58. Id. § 1.6; HARTE ET AL., supra note 56, at 334.

severely
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passage in 1980."9 Dubbed a vaguely-drafted bill with ambiguous
history,60
provisions and an often contradictory legislative
CERCLA has been deemed a "last minute compromise., 6 ' As a
result, many of CERCLA's key provisions are obscure and
unwieldy. But, with the knowledge at the time, and the myriad
interests and concerns involved, it can be said that CERCLA was
an excellent attempt to deal with an unidentified and
misunderstood problem.
The following analysis discusses
CERCLA's ability, or lack thereof, to address foreign military
base contamination.
A. CERCLA
CERCLA was created in 1980 as a response to the "serious6
1
environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.",
CERCLA acts as an enabling mechanism for the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"); it operates as a means to ensure that

59. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 65 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6141 (stating general opposition to H.R. 7020, Representative William Dannemeyer
remarked that "[w]hen the epitaph is written ... for the inactive hazardous waste sitecleanup bill [H.R. 7020] just reported by the full Commerce Committee it may well read
'noble of purpose but notorious in operation"'); see also Tom Bayko & Paul A. Share,
Stormy Weather on Superfund Front Forecastas "HurricaneSARA" Hits, NAT'L L.J., Feb.
16, 1987, at 24 ("Although there was widespread agreement on the urgent need for funds
and authority to clean up existing hazardous-waste sites, Congress was badly divided on
how to accomplish this task.").
60. "Although Congress had worked on 'Superfund' toxic and hazardous waste
cleanup bills ... for over three years, the actual bill which became law had virtually no
legislative history at all." Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (1982); see Ellen J. Garber, Federal Common Law of
Contribution Under the 1986 CERCLA Amendments, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365, 366 (1987).
The courts have also taken notice. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 823 F.2d 977,
980 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir.
1985)); McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1401, 1410 (N.D. Ohio
1987), aff'd, 856 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1988); Pinole Point Properties, Inc., v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn. 1982); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
61. Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d
Cir. 1988) ("CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision."). Amidst the final House
debates, Representatives identified over forty drafting errors in the bill that became
CERCLA. See 126 CONG. REC. 31,975-76 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Snyder); see also id. at
31,969-70 (remarking twenty-two serious problems with the bill).
62. Grad, supra note 60, at 2 (detailing the history of CERCLA).
63. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998).
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people uphold the tenets of the National Environmental
Protection Act ("NEPA"). 64 In essence, it authorizes the EPA to
conduct investigations of sites known, or possibly known, to
contain hazardous substances, as well as ensure efficient and
speedy clean-up of said sites, while ensuring that the parties
responsible for the contamination bear the costs of the clean-up.65
For the purposes of this Comment, those sections of CERCLA
which discuss the notification requirements, investigation process,
clean-up process, liability, cost allocation, contribution, and
geographic scope are of primary importance. Due to the
complexity and sheer size of this statute, this Comment will focus
on a brief discussion of only these aforementioned portions. This
Comment will also highlight cases which have interpreted and
limited the contours of CERCLA.
When military bases close, environmental assessments are
required

by

federal

law.

The

DOD

must

perform

an

Environmental Baseline Survey ("EBS") which will evaluate the
history of the base in order to note information on storage, release,
treatment, disposal, and spillage of all hazardous substances used
on the base.
Once the existence of a hazardous substance is found on a
base, CERCLA's investigation provisions come in to play.
CERCLA states: "Any person who is, or may be, affected by a
release [of a hazardous material] may petition the President to
conduct a preliminary
assessment of the hazards to public health
•
,,68
and the environment." The DOD then works under the EPA to
assess the extent of the contamination, the severity of the
hazardous substance, and whether the condition poses a
64
"substantial risk"
to the environment or human health. 61 CERCLA
states that this process will ensure that before military bases are
returned to civilians, "all remedial action necessary to protect
human health and the environment with respect to any

64. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).

65. See id. § 9607(a).
66. See 10 U.S.C. § 2687(b)(1) (2000).
67. Memorandum from William Perry, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to Secretaries of the
Military Departments et al., DOD Policy on the Environmental Review Process to Reach
a Finding of Suitability to Lease, Sept. 9, 1993, at 2.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d).
69. See id. § 9620.
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[hazardous] substance remaining on the property has been
taken."°
A citizen may bring a suit under CERCLA in only limited
circumstances. CERCLA enables one to bring a claim against
anyone "alleged to be in violation of any standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, or order" under CERCLA." Furthermore,
citizens can also bring claims against the U.S. government for
failing to enforce or adhere to their duties under CERCLA."
Thus, anyone can bring a claim against another individual or the
government, but only if that other is at least in part responsible for
the contamination.
1. Contribution
The two primary liability theories under CERCLA fall under
42 U.S.C. sections 9607(a), direct liability, and 9613(f),
contribution.3 Direct liability under section 9607(a) allows the
government or an "innocent" party to recoup clean-up costs from
potentially responsible persons ("PRPs"). The statute states that
PRPs shall be "liable for.., all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred by the United States government or a State [and] any
person."
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
This claim is rarely established because once control of the site has
passed hands, current owners/operators of facilities or vessels are
the hazardous substances and thus,
considered to have accepted
16
themselves become PRPs. Accordingly, in order to successfully
bring a claim under section 9607(a), an individual must effectively
sue before taking over the plant and before title has changed, or,
the plaintiff must be a completely innocent and uninvolved third
party. Based on this interpretation, a suit for contribution liability
under section 9613(f) is much more likely to survive than a suit for
direct liability when a motion for summary judgment or a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim has been lodged.77

70. Id. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii)(I).

71. Id. § 9659(a)(1).
72. Id. § 9659(a)(2).
73. Id. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f).
74. See id. § 9607(a).
75. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
76. See generally id. § 9607(a).
77. See generally Great Lakes Container Corp. v. Columbus Steel Drum Co., 54 F.
Supp. 2d 706 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
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In order to sue for contribution, section 9613(f)(1) states:
"[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is
liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during
or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or
under section 9607(a) of this title. 7 8 With what seems to be a
contradiction to the prior sentiment, CERCLA ends section 9613
with a "savings clause" that states: "Nothing in this subsection
shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for
contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of
this title or section 9607 of this title."7 9 While initially the
contribution clause and savings clause seem to conflict with one
another, the courts have determined that the clauses actually work
together. 8°
CERCLA states that "[i]n resolving contribution claims, the
court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate."' Thus,
once the court has determined that an adequate CERCLA claim
exists, and that the PRP is in fact liable for a portion of the cleanup costs, the court has discretion to determine what percentage of
the costs the defendant should bear.
Throughout the years, most CERCLA claims have been
based on contribution claims and very few have dealt with
extraterritoriality. During the contribution cases era, courts were
82
split on the issue surrounding section 9613(f)(1) of CERCLA.
78.
79.
80.
749-50

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
Id.
See e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 2d 740,
(D.N.J. 2003) (stating that "[t]he [savings] provision might allow a contribution

action to be brought . . . if the . . . plaintiff has already been sued by the primary
[contribution action] plaintiff under ... some other ... statute or common law cause of

action," or if "granted by coordinate CERCLA provisions ... or expressly granted by
other statutes which incorporate by reference CERCLA Section 113").
81.
82.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
Compare Johnson County Airport Comm'n v. Parsonitt Co., Inc., 916 F. Supp.

1090 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that an airport commission, who was a potential responsible
party, is not allowed to bring a CERCLA cost recovery action, however is entitled to seek
contribution under CERCLA) and Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis Chalmers Corp.,
974 F. Supp. 684, 691 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (stating "the [plaintiff] can bring a section
[contribution] action even when no prior or pending section 106 or 107 civil actions have
occurred") and Mathis v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 786 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (stating

the "statute by its plain terms and meaning prevents Plaintiffs from maintaining a defense
concerning the pendency of a civil action under CERCLA.") and Estes v. Scotsman
Group, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 983, 990 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that "PRP can bring a section
113 action even when no prior or pending section 106 or 107 civil actions have occurred")
with Deby, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., No. 99C2464, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2677 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
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Cases ranged from individuals suing companies, to companies
suing the U.S. government, to individuals suing the U.S.
government. In order to understand how CERCLA currently
works, we must look at some of the landmark CERCLA decisions.
One such landmark case is Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper
Industries, Inc.4 Cooper was owner of an aircraft engine
maintenance business that used petroleum and other hazardous
81
substances to repair engines. In 1981, Cooper sold its business
and facilities to Aviall, which later learned there was a substantial
amount of contamination on its facilities. 86 Aviall notified a state
environmental commission and by 1984, Aviall decided, sparing no
expense, to begin an environmental clean-up of his land.87 The
Texas circuit court held that "a PRP seeking contribution from
other PRPs under § [96]13(f)(1) must have a pending or adjudged
§ [96]06 administrative order or § [96]07(a) cost recovery action
''88 Thus, it appeared
against it.
Aviall put to rest the inquiry in
Texas, until that is, the
U.S.
Supreme
Court became involved in
•
89
the contribution dispute.
On rehearing en banc, the Texas circuit court held:
Section [96]13(f)(1) authorizes suits against PRPs in both its
first and last sentence which states without qualification that
'nothing' in the section shall 'diminish' any person's right to
bring a contribution action in the absence of a section [96]06 or
section [96107(a) action.90
In what has become a hotly debated case, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed the Texas circuit court,
remanding the case for further proceedings.9 1 Thus, the question of

29, 2000) (holding "[t]o receive 'actual compensation' ... the party [seeking contribution]
must have been found liable as a defendant in an earlier or pending action") and United
States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 351 (D.N.J. 1999) (stating that "a
certain form of common liability must exist in a contribution claim under CERCLA [and]
parties that have entered a consent decree with the United States without admitting
liability may maintain a ...claim for contribution").
83. See John A. Mick Letter, supra note 48.
84. Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc. (Aviall 1), 263 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2001).
85. Id. at 136.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 145.
89. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. (Aviall 111), 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
90. Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc. (Aviall H), 312 F. 3d 677, 681 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (emphasis added).
91. See Aviall III, 543 U.S. at 171.
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contribution has been answered by the Supreme Court and it can
now be said that CERCLA only allows contribution actions to be
brought by those who have already been sued under CERCLA by
a PRP or the United States government. Because it is unlikely that
the U.S. Attorney General will willingly, without pressure, sue the
DOD for an infringement of CERCLA, the contribution scheme
behind CERCLA affords little protection against foreign
environmental inury, that is, assuming the statute applies to
foreign territory. This assumption explains the later question
posed to the courts: Does CERCLA apply to foreign lands?
2. Extraterritoriality
The geographic scope of CERCLA is quite unclear as the
statute leaves much to interpretation. The statute is silent on the
area it covers and it makes no mention of boundaries or limits
when it refers to releases and sites. 93 In order to clarify the scope of
the statute, it is useful to look at the extraterritoriality principle
announced
S94 in Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo, called the Foley
Doctrine. The Foley Doctrine states that congressional legislation
is presumed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, unless, "language in the [relevant act] gives any
indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage
beyond places over which the United States has sovereignty."' 95
The principle further provides that "rules of the United States
statutory law, whether prescribed by federal or state authority,
apply only to conduct occurring within, or having effect within, the
territory of the United States. 96 Furthermore, courts assume that
Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption
against extraterritoriality and "is primarily concerned with

92. The DOD and the Attorney General are on the same side: both work for the
U.S. government and both have similar political concerns. While both groups might
acknowledge the concerns surrounding environmental damage on military bases, without
a large push from political or social forces, it is unlikely that one governmental branch will
willingly cause a legal confrontation with another branch. Thus, the contribution portions
of CERCLA make its requirements minimally effective against the U.S. government, even
for domestic environmental harms.
93. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d).
94. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
95. Id. at 285.
96. Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 38 (1965)).

2007] InternationalEnvironmentalBase Reconstruction Act

137

domestic conditions., 97 Beyond this, the specifics of CERCLA's
geographical scope have been left to the courts to decide.
The issue of CERCLA's scope was ignored by the courts until
a few years ago. The aforementioned Foley Doctrine seems to
suggest that when a statute is vague, the assumption should
be that
98
Congress legislates only for domestic issues of concern. Until the
issue was determined by a court, however, there was a chance that
someone would attempt to interpret CERCLA differently. In
2003, as an issue of first impression, the question of CERCLA's
geographic scope was brought to the California Northern District
Court.
Arc Ecology v. U.S. Department of the Air Force was a
CERCLA suit brought by Filipino citizens who lived and/or
traveled around former U.S. military base sites, and two private
organizations, namely Arc Ecology and the Filipino-American
Coalition. i°° The plaintiffs sued the United States in hopes of
compelling the U.S. military to conduct preliminary assessments of
the environmental pollution - and engage in cost recovery
programs on - former U.S. military bases in the Philippines. While
the Court found the Filipino citizens had standing to sue, it held
that CERCLA did not apply extraterritorially and, thus, no
CERCLA suit was available for environmental damage in the
Philippines.0 1 Arc Ecology reiterated the principle that "[clourts
must assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of an
underlying presumption against extraterritoriality," and that said
assumption cannot be overcome without a clear Congressional
statement that the legislation should apply abroad. Thus, it was
determined that CERCLA did not apply to properties located
outside of United States territories.
In 2005, Arc Ecolokv was reargued before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.1 3 Again, the plaintiff
citizens and residents of the Philippines argued that CERCLA

97. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.
98. See id.
99. See Arc Ecology v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force (Arc Ecology I), 294 F. Supp. 2d
1152 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
100. Id. at 1153-54.
101. Id. at 1159.
102. Id. at 1157-58.
103. Arc Ecology v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force (Arc Ecology II), 411 F.3d 1092 (9th

Cir. 2005).
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applied extraterritorially to afford them relief. The appeals court
agreed with the district court on similar grounds, finding that
CERCLA does not provide extraterritorial application.
The
appeals court closely reviewed section 9605(d) of CERCLA and
determined that the locations and geographic boundaries were
vague,10 6 that the Foley doctrine applied to the case, and that the
courts of the United States presume legislation only applies to acts
within the United States.)° Thus, the Arc Ecology cases hold that
CERCLA is not an extraterritorial document and its application 8is
States)
strictly limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the United
The decision to limit CERCLA's extraterritorial application
illuminates the inherent bias within the statute. Numerous cost
recovery and remediation claims fail under CERCLA (as well as
other U.S. environmental legislation) because of the Foley
Doctrine. Thus, it seems that while the U.S. military actively
inhabits foreign territories, it is not legally forced to act
environmentally responsible, except when in resides in U.S.
territories.
Thus, plaintiffs relying upon a U.S. statute have a difficult
time obtaining an adequate remedy without Congress' express
intent for the statute to apply extraterritorially. At present, there
are very few attempts to sue the U.S. government under
CERCLA. 109 CERCLA appears to stand for the principle that
those who pollute should bear the costs of the pollution and the
repair of the environment, a principle known as the Polluter Pays
Principle. This holds true notwithstanding the acknowledgement,
in CERCLA and by its Congressional drafters, that the Polluter

104. Id. at 1094.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1096-97.
107. See id. at 1097 (citing Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285).
108. See e.g., Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No, CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23041, at *12-13 (E.D. Wash. 2004) (While this assumption is generally true,
there have been a few cases which hold that CERCLA applies to territories outside of the
U.S. One case in particular enumerated that CERCLA could be applied to contamination

of a non-U.S. territory if a failure to apply CERCLA would result in adverse effects within
the United States).
109.

While there may be lawsuits in the making, beyond Arc Ecology I & II, there are

very few cases which exhibit an attempt to sue the U.S. government, in a U.S. court, for
environmental damage in foreign lands. Furthermore, there are virtually zero cases in
international courts, thus further suggesting the lack of adequate remedies for foreign

countries faced with these environmental problems, both via domestic and international
law.
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Pays Principle should apply to all environmental contamination
problems. Apparently, in practice CERCLA contradicts its own
stated intentions.
B. InternationalEnvironmentalPrinciples
The number of international environmental declarations has
exploded over the last thirty years. As more countries awaken to
the seriousness of transboundary and global ecological threats,
they are searching for answers from the international community.
The existence of these declarations, however, has not entirely
solved the problems associated with international environmental
threats. Whether the problem is implementation, enforcement, or
scope, the environmental damage that has occurred and continues
to occur on military bases remains unaddressed and unanswered
by international law. Before one can understand how international
environmental principles fail, we must first explore and understand
what it is the international laws attempt to do."
1. Declaration-based Customary International Law
One of the most commonly applied principles of international
environmental law can be found in the United Nations Stockholm
Declaration of 1972 ("Stockholm Declaration").
The United
Nations General Assembly stated that the "main purpose" of the
Stockholm Conference was to "serve as a practical means to
encourage, and to provide guidelines for, action by Governments
and international organizations designed to protect and improve
the human environment and to remedy and ,prevent
its
impairment, by means of international co-operation."

110.

U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENVTL. POLICY &

GUIDANCE, COMPREHENSIVE

ENVTL. RESPONSE, COMP., AND LIAB. ACT (2006), http://www.eh.doe.gov/

oepa/laws/cercla.html.
111. Customary international environmental law can be defined as the law of nations
or well-established, universally recognized norms of international law, where the nations
of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several,
concern, by means of express international accords. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
888 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
112. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972,
Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. DOC.
A/CONF.48/14/REV.1 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
113. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, G.A. Res. 2581
(XXIV), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A17916 (Dec. 15, 1969). See generally Louis B. Sohn, The
Stockholm Declarationon the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423 (1973).
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The Stockholm Conference was one of the most successful
and widely attended United Nations conferences ever held .114
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration is extremely wellknown in the international environmental world. Principle 21
articulates that "[s]tates have ...

the responsibility to ensure that

activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction."'' 5 Principle 21 gave life to a new
international environmental norm; it demanded that all countries
safeguard the environment of not only their own nation, but that
of all nations.' 6 Applied here, Principle 21 admonishes the
environmental damage in the Philippines and Panama as a
violation of the Stockholm Declaration. Thus, under the
Stockholm Declaration, the U.S. would be held responsible for
both the environmental damage and its consequences.
Another common international environmental principle
comes from the Rio Declaration, created at the 1992 Rio
Conference on Environment and Development. "7 The Rio
Declaration is considered one of the most fundamental and
influential international environmental documents ever created. It
is referred to as an "instrument of international jurisprudence
[that] articulates policies and prescriptions directed at the
achievement of worldwide sustainable development."'1 8 Principle 1
of the Rio Declaration states that "[h]uman beings are at the
center of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled
to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature. ' *
While the Rio Declaration links a clean and healthy
environment with development and the protection of human
health, many have criticized the document as too soft.1 20 Because it
114.
115.
116.
117.

Sohn, supra note 113, at 423-24, 431-32.
Stockholm Declaration,supra note 112, princ. 21.
Sohn, supra note 113, at 485-86, 492-93.
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio de

Janeiro, Braz., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N.
A/CONF.151/26/REV.1(VOL.I) (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].

Doc.

118. John Batt & David C. Short, The Jurisprudenceof the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development: A Law, Science, and Policy Explication of Certain Aspects
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 8 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 229, 230 (1993).

119. Rio Declaration,supra note 117, princ. 1.
120. Sumudu Atapattu, The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The
Emergence of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment Under InternationalLaw, 16 TUL.

ENVTL. L.J. 65,78 (2002).
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has been viewed as soft law, the Rio Declaration has had little
power as customary international environmental law. 12' The Rio
Declaration is the product of overwhelmingly diplomatic concerns
commonly found in international declarations. Due to the diverse
nature of international meetings and the dissimilar concerns
expressed by nations, declarations with concrete principles and
real-world implications are often few and far between. 122 In order
to keep all parties content, declarations are often vague, overly
broad, and indiscernible. This vagueness makes the Rio and
Stockholm Declarations difficult to apply in U.S. courts.
In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation ("Flores I"), a
2003 Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA")123 case, plaintiffs attempted
to apply principles from the Stockholm and Rio Declarations in a
U.S. court. Flores I involved Peruvian plaintiffs who claimed a
Southern Peru Copper Corporation had caused extensive pollution
in the areas in which they lived. The plaintiffs faulted the copper
corporation for their own, or the decedents', life-threatening lung
disease.126 Flores I found that the plaintiffs had not "demonstrated
that high levels of environmental pollution within a nation's
borders, causing harm to human life, health, and development,
violate well-established, universally recognized norms of
law,"'' 27 and thus, failed to state a claim under the
international
28
ATCA1

A number of reasons were given in Flores I as to why the
Stockholm and Rio Declarations were insufficient bases of
customary international environmental law. The plaintiffs
Stockholm and Rio Declaration-based claims were rejected
because they "d[id] not set forth any specific proscriptions, but
rather refer[red] only in a general sense to the responsibility of
nations," and because the "documents [spoke] in terms of rights,
121. Barry E. Hill et al., Human Rights and the Environment: A Synopsis and Some
Predictions,16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 359,376 (2004).
122. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp. (Flores 11), 414 F.3d 233, 263 (2d Cir.2003).
123. The ATCA allows foreign nationals to bring cases resounding in tort to district
courts of the United States. The ATCA states that: "the district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
124.
2002).
125.
126.
127.
128.

Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp. (Flores 1), 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y.
Id. at 511-12.
Id.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 525.
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but they d[id] not identify any prohibited conduct that [wa]s
relevant to th[e] case.' ' 2 9 Thus, Flores I held that the Rio and
Stockholm Declarations failure to clearly state the prohibited
conduct made the principles impossible to apply in a U.S. court of
law.
When brought up on appeal, the Flores I decision was
reaffirmed and the case dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 13 The appellate court in Flores H
listed a few more reasons for their decision. With regard to the Rio
and Stockholm Declarations, Flores H found the principles were
"boundless" and "indeterminate."' 131 The Flores H court further
explained that the Stockholm and Rio Declarations "express[ed]
virtuous goals understandably expressed at a level of abstraction
needed to secure the adherence of States that disagree on many of
the particulars regarding how actually to achieve them.",132 In this
way, Flores II held that the Stockholm and Rio Declarations only
stated "abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or
discernable standards and regulations."'33 Thus, generally U.S.
courts find that the Stockholm and Rio Declarations' principles
are entirely too vague and limitless to be applied as customary
international environmental law.
As was evidenced in the Flores cases, U.S. courts have found
that, "as a practical matter, it is impossible for courts to discern or
apply in any rigorous, systematic, or legal manner international34
pronouncements that promote amorphous, general principles."'
Sadly, while declarations are a primary method for creating
customary international environmental law, they are not ironclad
and often pose many problems regarding enforceability.
A large problem with enforcing declarations is their lack of
coherence and diplomatic language. Declarations often, in hopes
of keeping the largest number of states happy, fail to make clear
and concrete demands. Instead, they produce broad, general ideas
shared by the international community, without any method with

129. Id. at 519; see also Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F.Supp. 668, 671
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
130. Flores H,414 F.3d at 266.
131. Id. at 255.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 1999)).
134. Id. at 252.
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which to ensure adherence or punish noncompliance. But, one
scholar has contradicted this notion by suggesting that:
[International agreements] convey clear signals regarding the
policy content and underpinnings of authority of the normative
concepts involved, as well as the willingness of the international
community to ensure their effectiveness, and as such must be
deemed capable of creating rights and obligations both for [...]
states and [...] organizations.
While this view is admirable, the reality behind most international
declarations, conventions, accords, and some treaties, is quite the

opposite. Many international agreements are seen as starting off
points, views reminiscent of a global agreement, intended to spur
further understanding and concrete principles.
At first glance, the outlook for international environmental
cooperation seems dismal. Solving environmental problems would
require a demanding collective effort. The needed international
commitments would be costly to implement, and incentives to
defect would be high."' Yet, nearly every international

environmental agreement lacks a formal mechanism for rigorous

135.

Gunther Handl, The Legal Mandate of MultilateralDevelopment Banks as Agents

for Change Toward SustainableDevelopment, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 642,661 (1998).
136.

See generally, Rio Declaration, supra note 117. The language used in the Rio

Declaration suggested courses of action, as opposed to prescribing what should constitute
appropriate behavior. Use of the word "should," as opposed to "shall" seems to indicate
that the declaration was neither intended to be binding upon states, nor particularly
assertive.
137. Truly solving most international environmental problems would require
substantial and costly interventions in the economy that would affect competitiveness of
firms and give firms and governments an incentive to skirt their obligations. For example,
stabilizing the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, necessary to stop global
warming, could cost trillions of dollars if required over the next several decades. There is
little precedent revealing how international agreements work when the stakes are so high.
However, the imperfect record of compliance with trade agreements suggests that high
stakes lead to incentives to defect. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW: THE EVOULTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 362 (1993).
Furthermore, the long history of suspicions about noncompliance with arms control
agreements illustrates the concern that governments have about noncompliance. For a
review of the compliance literature, see J.H. Ausubel & D.G. Victor, Verification of
InternationalEnvironmental Agreements, 17 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV'T 1 (1992). For
more theoretical treatments of the issues, which lead to the conclusion that incentives to
defect are strong when stakes are high and reciprocal enforcement is not available (which
is often true when managing public goods like environmental quality), see George W.
Downs et al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?, 50
INT'L ORG. 379 (1996).
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monitoring of compliance.
In fact, only two of the major
multilateral environmental agreements have functioning and
active compliance mechanisms. 39 Of those documents that do have
such provisions, such as the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and the Montreal
Protocol, the powers available to the procedure are minimal,

mainly a source of exhortation.14 °

International agreements, regardless of their unclear or wide
principles, should nonetheless be accepted as assertions of
customary international law by the international community. 141 In
fact, these pronouncements create privileges and responsibilities
that those signing the declaration intend to uphold. U.S. courts,
however, have interpreted
international documents and
agreements in a dramatically different way, impugning the
inchoate rights and duties by refusing to apply them in their

courtrooms.

138. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A
SURVEY OF EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 8-14 (Peter H. Sand ed., 1992) [hereinafter
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS].

139. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora art. VIII, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (the "infractions reports"
system) [hereinafter CITES]; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer art. 8, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) (the "NonCompliance Procedure") [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. For an overview of the field of
international environmental law that comes to this conclusion, see EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 138 (an authoritative
study prepared for the secretariat of the United Nations Commission on Environment and
Development [UNCED]). But, the United Nations Framework Convention, on Climate
Change art. 13, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force March 21, 1994)
[hereinafter Climate Change Convention], available at http://www.unfccc.de/
resource/conv/index.html, includes a "multilateral consultative process" that, in part, is
intended as a mechanism for reviewing compliance. The design draws heavily on the
Montreal Protocol's Non-Compliance Procedure, which is widely seen as a success and is
the most recent "model" available to diplomats when they sit down to craft a new

procedure. The Non-Compliance Procedure thereby replicates itself, though remarkably
little attention is given to whether and why the Montreal "model" has been successful and
whether and how it might be applied in other situations. For further guidance on this issue,
see David G. Victor, The Early Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's
Non-Compliance Procedure (Int'l Inst. for Applied Sys. Analysis Executive Report ER96-2, 1996) availableat http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/ DocumentsER-96-002.html.
140. See EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS,
supra note 138.
141. See Handl, supra note 135, at 660 n.134.
142. See, e.g,. Flores II, 414 F.3d at 254-55, 258 (holding that "right to life" and "right
to health" are insufficiently definite to constitute rules of customary international law or

to prohibit international pollution).
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While declarations give the international community written
international environmental principles, in many instances the
effectiveness of declarations is diminutive. Particularly in the area
of environmental damage on foreign soil, declarations have
afforded little or no remedy to complaining parties.' 43 With the
process of meeting, agreeing, signing, and allowing adequate time
and consideration to be given to the broad and varying interests
involved, the diplomatic approach in drafting international
environmental declarations has fallen far short of what it desires to
accomplish.
2. Other Principles of Customary International Law
A familiar and functional international environmental
principle is known as the Polluter Pays Principle ("PPP").'44 This
principle is said to have been officially recognized by the
international community when it was included in the Rio
Declaration. 14 The PPP can be found at Principle 16 of Rio, where
it states that:
National authorities should endeavor to promote the
internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic
instruments, taking into account the approach146that the polluter
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution.
Generally, Principle 16 creates the theory that, when
environmental damage occurs, those responsible for the damage
clean-up.14 7
should be responsible for the remediation costs and
The PPP has been widely accepted as a valid customary
international environmental law and has been applied in a number
of both international and U.S. documents. 4 CERCLA happens to
be one of the documents which pronounces the principle, and in

143. See generally Beanal v. Reeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999)
(stating international documents with no "articulable or discernable standards and
regulations to identify practices that constitute international environmental abuses or

torts" are an insufficient basis for such a claim based on international law).
144. See Rio Declaration,supra note 117, princ. 16.
145. See Jonathan R. Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution
Allowances and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 470-71

(2000).
146. Rio Declaration,supra note 117, princ. 16.
147. Id.
148. Rio Declaration, supra note 117; CERCLA, supra note 64. See generally Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 125 [hereinafter Basel Convention].
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fact, CERCLA imposes liability on the polluter for the clean-up
and remediation costs of sites contaminated by hazardous
wastes.1 49 Thus, CERCLA advances the PPP and the idea that the
U.S. military and government should pay for the remediation of
prior and presently contaminated military sites. The way in which
CERCLA has been interpreted in U.S. courts, however, makes the
realization of this principle close to impossible.
As applied to the Philippines and Panama, the PPP supports
the argument that because the U.S. is the party responsible for
creating environmental hazards in and around military bases, it has
the obligation to compensate the governments and the individuals
directly injured by said hazards. The international community
recognizes a general right to a clean and safe environment,
undaunted by other nations' actions within their own or other
countries."' Furthermore, the international community embraces
the PPP as valid customary international law and has begun to
codify the principle in a number of international documents. Yet,
the Philippines and Panama are left with no remedy. We must ask
why the picture never materializes when it seems the pieces to the
puzzle are all laid out.
C. Problems With Existing Regimes
The problems the international community faces are grim. On
one hand, it seems the world agrees that the protection of the
environment is an international concern which reaches to the
depths of human rights and the sustainable development of the
human race and the world."' Yet, reality demonstrates that nations
are quick to blame environmental degradation on anyone and

149. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. See generally REPORT OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF THE COMM. ON PUB. WORKS AND TRANSP.,
ADMIN. OF THE FED. SUPERFUND PROGRAM, H.R. DOC. NO. 103-35, at 12 (1993)

(stating "the Superfund liability scheme has ... resulted in private party funding of more
than 60 percent of Superfund cleanups"); J. Whitney Pesnell, The Contribution Bar in
CERCLA Settlements and Its Effect on the Liability of Nonsettlors, 58 LA. L. REV. 167, 190
(1997) (stating that polluter pays principle is "one of the central objectives or goals" of
CERCLA).
150. See generally Military Mess, supra note 33; GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 27-30.
151. See Rio Declaration,supra note 117, princ. 2.
152. See generally Basel Convention, supra note 148; Rio Declaration,supra note 117,
princ. 16; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
153. See Wagner & Popovic, supra note 9, at 480 (stating that "[t]he link between
environmental problems and human rights has given rise to an increasingly well defined
and well-recognized body of 'environmental human rights[] principles").
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everyone but themselves and shirk responsibility for their own
destructive practices. As policymakers and legal scholars agree,
something must be done to give t, some • teeth
to the existing
154
international and domestic legal frameworks. Out of the chaos,
there appear to be three primary weaknesses in the current
international environmental and domestic environmental regimes:
(1) the heavy hand of the Foley Doctrine, (2) the difficulty of
overcoming contribution requirements, and (3) international
declaration weakness. These weaknesses make the current legal
climate afforded to foreign military sites inadequate. Some change
is necessary.
D. An Adequate Solution
Providing mere illustrations of the environmental issues
found at abandoned military bases suffices to raise awareness, but
this Comment seeks to provide an aptly designed solution to the
problem. Upon the foregoing discussion of CERCLA
jurisprudence and international treaty law, it seems apparent that
neither current customary and declaration-based international
environmental law, nor current U.S. domestic environmental law
can adequately address this problem. Nonetheless, domestic law
should be the first step to address this complex and severe
international issue.
In the current political climate, the invasion and occupation of
foreign territories and expansion of military bases within those
territories is overwhelming. Based on the past and present, it
would seem most advantageous to the international community if
the U.S. Congress creates a statutory addendum to CERCLA.
What follows is a sample document evidencing what the new
legislation would require:
THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MILITARY
BASE RECONSTRUCTION ACT: S A155 model law for
introduction to the United States Legislature
154. See generally Rio Declaration,supra note 117, princ. 13 (declaring that"[s]tates
shall cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop further
international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of
environmental damage .... "). See generally Wagner & Popovic, supra note 9, at 499-505
(discussing the potential legal remedies for Panamanians affected by U.S. military
activities).
155. The following draft statute is largely based on The Seventh Generation Act: a
model law for introduction in state legislatures. The statute is a non-binding suggestive
document written and drafted for the International Law Center for Human, Economic &
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1. Short title.
This Act shall be known as the Military Base Reconstruction
Act.
2. Purpose.
The Legislature is concerned that the U.S. military occupations
on foreign lands threaten the environmental resources that will
be needed to sustain future generations in those countries and
abroad. The Legislature acknowledges that environmental
damage is accustomed to many forms of military operations and
thus, in many instances, is unavoidable. It finds that such costs
of remediation, abatement and repair should fall on the polluter
and not the polluted. Also cognizant of the changing
international world we live in and the growing trend of U.S.
military occupations resting on foreign lands, and further
considering the current international war-filled times we live in,
and the expanding borders of Nations amidst an international
war on terror, the Legislature finds this Act both necessary and
timely for the military future we face. Conscious of the impact
environmental pollution has upon present and future nations,
mindful of its legal responsibility as ultimate trustee of all
natural resources, acknowledging that a healthy environment is
a fundamental human right under international law and the law
of this Nation, and acting under its police power to suppress
nuisances and protect the health, safety and welfare of its
citizens, the Legislature adopts this Act to slow the destruction
of vital natural resources.
3. Scope.
This Act shall apply both domestically and abroad, in all
Nations, equally. Further, access to U.S. courts shall be
available to all Nations involved with military bases, both
polluter and polluted, with fairness and justice. Standing, forum
non conveniens, alienage, and locus quo detrimentum shall not
impact the ability to bring suits for recovery in the United
States court. The principle against extraterritoriality shall not
apply and the Legislature expressly grants this Act
extraterritorial application.
4. Liability.

Environmental Defense. While the statute focuses upon a potential state law for the
general protection of the environment, its core themes, and structure transfer well to the
military base context. Both form and content have been used from the Seventh
Generation Act in creating the Military Base Reconstruction Act. Robert Benson, The
Seventh Generation Act. A Model Law Allowing Law Suits For Damage to Natural
Resources Needed to Sustain Future Generations, International Law Center for Human,
Economic & Environmental Defense 6-7 (Summer 1997) (on file with author).
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(a) Every State, Nation, government entity, corporation,
partnership or sole proprietorship working for said State,
Nation or government entity shall be liable for unsafe damages
it causes after the effective date of this Act through injury,
destruction, or loss of vital natural resources.
(b) As used in this section: "unsafe damages" means damages
that are likely to harm the health and wellness of individuals,
destroy natural resources, reduce natural flora and fauna, and
contamination of any vital natural resources. "Vital natural
resources" are biological diversity, topsoil, water, and the
atmosphere. "Biological diversity" means the variability among
living organisms from all sources including, terrestrial, marine
and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of
which they are part; this includes diversity within species,
between species and of ecosystems. "Ecosystem" means a
dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism
communities and their non-living environment interacting as a
functional unit.
5. Enforcement.
The U.S. attorney general and prosecutors of any county, city
or state in the Unites States or other Nations may bring suit in a
federal court of competent jurisdiction to enforce this Act. Any
person resident in the polluted Nation may notify the attorney
general and appropriate local prosecutors of an alleged
violation of the Act. If none of those officers files suit within
ninety days after receiving notice, then that person may file suit
on behalf of the public as a private attorney general in either
their National court or a federal court of the United States. A
private attorney general who substantially prevails shall be
entitled to attorneys' fees and court costs. Any damages
recovered by the attorney general, prosecutors, or a private
attorney general shall be directed by the court wholly to fund
restoration, replacement, or mitigation of damage to vital
natural resources and the public health in said foreign lands.
6. Calculation of damages.
(a) The court shall set damages in an amount adequate to
restore or replace the resources injured, destroyed or lost. If
restoration or replacement is infeasible, or is grossly
disproportionate in cost to the value of the resources injured,
destroyed or lost, then the court in its sound discretion shall set
damages by another generally accepted method that best
advances the purposes of this Act. In every case, however, the
court shall value resources by their existence and use values.
(b) As used in this section: "existence values" are those values
inherent in the mere presence of biological resources; their
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existence adds to the richness of our own lives and the planet
and has value without consideration of its usefulness to
mankind. "Use values" are those values which serve mankind;
water purification and flood control, soil maintenance,
decomposition, and disposal of wastes are examples of use
values.
7. Preemption.
This Act neither preempts nor is modified by existing laws. It
supplements them. Compliance with this Act does not relieve
any duty arising from those laws. Compliance with those laws
raises no defense to violations of this Act.
8. Effective date.
This Act takes effect one year after the date of its enactment.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the last thirty years international environmental law has
made incredible leaps in the corpus of legitimate international law.
Strides have been made in declaration-based law, customary
international law, and even domestic environmental legislation.
While the world continues to acknowledge the value of vital
biological resources for the future of all species, much remains to
be done.
Currently, the treaty-based international and U.S.-based
domestic remedies for environmental damage on U.S. military
bases in foreign countries are inadequate and the U.S. is just the
country to act first, take charge, and lead by example.
In this Comment I have considered the cause, nature, and
effects of U.S. military base occupations. Using the Philippines and
Panama as case studies, I have sought to analyze U.S. military
occupations in these countries and the nature of the environmental
damage left behind. After highlighting the real-world problem, I
then considered the legal problems, such as inadequate remedies
and insufficient restoration. While considering liability, I have
uncovered the various loopholes through which the U.S. leaps to
shirk its environmental responsibilities.
Both American environmental liability regimes and
international environmental liability regimes have attempted to
offer appropriate remedies for the clean-up of U.S. military bases,
but these regimes have been stymied in the U.S. courts. Finally, in
drafting a model statute, I have hoped to spur discussion, suggest a
solution, and spur change in this complex and vital area of the law.
Such a statute would positively impact our planet and strengthen
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our already weakened relationship with the international
community.
Civil liability in the form of a federal statute would open the
door to the U.S. legal system, both to non-governmental
organizations and other private parties who desire to protect the
international environment in a way not currently afforded in
international law. Further, international law can assume new
significance and vitality if used in conjunction with civil liability. A
statute such as the Military Base Reconstruction Act can be a
valuable complement to existing customary international law.
Because domestic compliance and enforcement mechanisms are
more sophisticated and effective than those created by
international agreements, the Military Base Reconstruction Act
can combine both the enforcement power of a statute and the
goals commonly found in international environmental documents.
Finally, Nations can often move more quickly and effectively than
international institutions; such actions may enable those wronged
by U.S. military occupations to finally receive their long overdue
remedy, as justice and the law so requires.
Tania Marie Proechel°

* 2007 J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School - Los Angeles. I would like to dedicate this
Comment to my fianc6 Sean for his constant support and intellectual encouragement.
"And when love speaks, the voice of all the gods makes heaven drowsy with the
harmony." - William Shakespeare.

